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We introduce a framework for studying collective search by teams. Discoveries are correlated over time and governed by a Brownian path, where search speed is jointly controlled. Agents individually choose when to cease search and implement their best discovery. We characterize equilibrium and optimal policies. Search speeds are constant within active alliances and depend on complementarities between members. A drawdown stopping boundary governs each agent’s search termination. The consequent exit waves, whereby possibly heterogeneous agents cease search simultaneously, exhibit deterministic sequencing but stochastic timing. We highlight environments with lower than optimal equilibrium speeds and search durations, and different exit waves.more » « less
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null (Ed.)The search for good outcomes–be it government policies, technological breakthroughs, or lasting purchases–takes time and effort. At times, the decision process is unconstrained: an individual seeking a well-priced product determines her search scope and time as she wishes. At times, search is constrained, either through institutions or cognitive limitations. We consider retrospective search in both settings: an agent chooses the search scope and time, selecting the best observed outcome upon stopping. We analyze the impacts of constraints when observed samples are independent and correlated over time.more » « less
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null (Ed.)May's theorem (1952), a celebrated result in social choice, provides the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that grant voters identical roles. We show that a weakening of May's symmetry assumption allows for a far richer set of rules that still treat voters equally. We show that such rules can have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population, but not less than the square root of the population size. Methodologically, we introduce techniques from group theory and illustrate their usefulness for the analysis of social choice questions.more » « less
